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The Tinbergen Rule has been used to criticise multi-target policy instruments for being inefﬁcient. The
aim of this paper is to clarify the role of multi-target policy instruments using the case of agri-
environmental policy. Employing an analytical linear optimisation model, this paper demonstrates
that there is no general contradiction between multi-target policy instruments and the Tinbergen Rule, if
multi-target policy instruments are embedded in a policy-mix with a sufﬁcient number of targeted in-
struments. We show that the relation between cost-effectiveness of the instruments, related to all policy
targets, is the key determinant for an economically sound choice of policy instruments. If economies of
scope with respect to achieving policy targets are realised, a higher cost-effectiveness of multi-target
policy instruments can be achieved. Using the example of organic farming support policy, we discuss
several reasons why economies of scope could be realised by multi-target agri-environmental policy
instruments.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Agri-environmental measures have been introduced in the Eu-
ropean Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) primarily for reducing
negative environmental externalities of agriculture. The EU allows
members states to choose from a portfolio of different instruments
and to set payment levels according to region-speciﬁc opportunity
costs and necessities. In the current programming period EU
Member States allocate on average 30% of their rural development
programme budgets towards these schemes (EC, 2012). In
Switzerland, agri-environmental direct payments receive about
29% of the all direct payments and 14% of total spending for agri-
culture (FOAG, 2012).
There is a substantial body of literature analysing speciﬁc
measures or instruments with respect to environmental effective-
ness and economic efﬁciency (Bakam et al., 2012; Carey et al., 2003;
Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). The importance of targeting andfax: þ41 (0)62 865 7273.
(C. Schader), nic.l@
ueller@ﬁbl.org (A. Muller),
), Hamstead Marshall, New-tailoring of policies to achieve maximum effectiveness with a given
budget or to minimize spending for achieving the targets set has
been stressed by economists and policy makers (OECD, 2007b). It is
therefore necessary to compare both environmental impacts and
the societal costs of agri-environmental policy instruments with
each other in order to provide a basis for economically sound policy
design (Pearce, 2005; Primdahl et al., 2010).
The Tinbergen Rule (1956) has been a guiding principle for
economists and policy makers for more than 50 years. It is appli-
cable generally across all economic sectors and has been discussed
with respect to agricultural policy, waste policy, health policy, en-
ergy policy and climate policy (Ahrens and Lippert, 1994; Braathen,
2007; Knudson, 2009). The main statement of the Tinbergen Rule is
that efﬁcient policy requires at least as many policy instruments as
there are targets. The common interpretation of this rule is to
favour single-target policy instruments over broader instruments.
Tinbergen's thoughts have also substantially inﬂuenced agri-
environmental policy (Mann, 2005b). Multi-target policy in-
struments, in particular cross-compliance (Mann, 2005a) and
support for organic farming via direct payments (von Alvensleben,
1998) have been evaluated to be inefﬁcient as their multi-target
character seems to contradict Tinbergen's postulate. However,
empirical data from evaluation studies is scarce due to methodo-
logical constraints (Viaggi et al., 2011) and does not permit the
Fig. 1. Targets and instrument links in agricultural policy according to Tinbergen's model.
2 Note that this is only the case for Tinbergen's ﬁxed-target model. Assuming
ﬂexible targets, there will be a solution, irrespective of the number of instruments.
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policy instruments.
Thus, the ﬁrst aim of this paper is to explore how the econom-
ically optimal mix between single and multi-target policies can be
determined. The second aim is to illustrate advantageous and
disadvantageous conditions for multi-target policy instruments in
policy mixes and to analyse howmulti-target policies integrated in
a policy-mix impact cost-effectiveness. We have chosen to use
support for organic farming as an example of a multi-target policy,
as the organic production standards that are supported by such
policies have been developed to address a range of environmental,
food and social goals (Schader et al., 2012).
In order to pursue these aims, an analytical linear optimisation
model was used. The model simulates the decision-making process
from the viewpoint of a rational policy maker, with speciﬁed policy
targets and a set of instruments to reach these targets, subject to
minimisation of public expenditure as the objective function.
In this paper, we provide a brief summary of the theory behind
the Tinbergen Rule and clarify its implications for policy mixes and
multi-target policies (Section 2). We explain the analytical model to
systematically analyse the problem (Section 3). The results of the
modelling exercise are presented in Section 4, while Section 5
discusses the model assumptions and results against their degree
of realism. Finally, conclusions for science and policy are drawn in
Section 6.
2. Tinbergen Rule and agri-environmental policy
In this section, we review the Tinbergen Rule and discuss its
relevance for policy mixes and multi-target policies under consid-
eration of economies of scope.
2.1. Review of Tinbergen's model for quantitative policy analysis
Criticising standard policy making for (a) its trial and error
approach, (b) the isolated view of single measures (widely ignoring
the effects of measures on other aims), and (c) qualitative argu-
ments for changing policies, Tinbergen introduced a quantitative
approach to policy making taking into account several policy in-
struments and targets at once (Tinbergen, 1956, p. 53ff).With this model, he demonstrated that efﬁcient economic pol-
icy needs at least as many independent policy instruments as there
are targets. He deﬁned four types of variables: (a) policy-
instrument variables which are determinable by a policy maker
(with respect to agri-environmental policy this could be taxes on
fertilizer or public expenditure for the policy instrument “organic
farming area support payments”); (b) target variables which are
relevant for the system of policy targets (e.g. protection of natural
resources like soil, water, air and biodiversity), (c) variables which
are not (or not fully) controllable by the policy maker (e.g. agri-
environmental policy does not control inﬂation or national un-
employment rates); and (d) neutral variables which are irrelevant
to the system of policy targets. Both policy instrument variables
and target variables feed into the system of policy targets (Fig. 1).
Tinbergen modelled the structural relations between these four
types of variables as a linear equation system. Each policy target yj'
j¼ 1,…,J is described by a linear equation of the non-controllable
variables, the irrelevant variables and the unknown policy instru-
ment variables zk' k¼ 1,…,K that should be determined by solving the
equation system. Thus, by the basic properties of linear equation
systems, Tinbergen concluded that if the number of independent
policy instrument variables equals the number of policy targets, i.e. if
the number of unknown variables equals the number of equations in
the equation system, his model will have one solution. However, if
the number of target variables (i.e. equations) does not match the
number of policy instrument variables, the equation system is either
over- or underdetermined. If there are more policy instrument var-
iables than policy targets (i.e. equations), the equation system has an
inﬁnite number of solutions. In the opposite case, if there are fewer
policy instrument variables than policy targets, the equation system
only has a solution in accidental cases.2 Furthermore, Tinbergen ar-
gues that even if in this latter case there is an optimal solution, this
solution will be inﬂexible with respect to changes in variables over
time that are not directly controlled by the policy maker. This means,
if we use a mix of policy instruments for achieving a set of given
policy targets, the number of independent policy instruments should
Table 1
Possible combinations of policy instruments and policy targets.
Number of policy targets
Number
of policy instruments 1 2 or more
1 A : Single-target
policy
C : Multi-target policy
2 or more B : Policy mix of 
policy 
instruments with 
the same single 
target
D : Policy mix of single and/or 
multi-target policy 
instruments
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from this general formalism no restriction can be derived that each
policy instrument should contribute to the achievement of only one
target. Each policy instrument can also contribute to several targets.
The policy instruments used need only to be independent from each
other, i.e. none of them is a linear combination of the others.3
Principally, we can distinguish between cases where one or
several policy targets are pursued with either one or several policy
instruments. Table 1 shows possible combinations of different
numbers of policy instruments and policy targets. In most policy
areas, multiple policy targets are pursued simultaneously. There-
fore, we can neglect cases A and B with only one policy target to be
achieved. If there are two ormore policy targets, policymakers have
the option to address these by amulti-target policy (C) or by a policy
mix of single target and/or multi-target policy instruments (D).
As we have seen above, policymakers should opt for at least two
independent policy instruments, if there are two policy targets.
Otherwise, Tinbergen’s model will most probably have no solution,
or if it has one, this will be inﬂexible. Thus, Option C, i.e. onemulti-
target policy instrument, will most likely not achieve multiple ﬁxed
policy targets.
However, the most interesting and relevant case in Table 1 is
Option D: Multiple policy targets can be achieved by a combination
of single- and/or multi-target policy instruments, as long as the
number of these independent policy instruments is equal to or
greater than the number of policy targets. This is a common case for
policy makers in European States when they prepare their rural
development plans. In Section 4, we will analyse this case in detail
in order to ﬁnd the optimal combination of single and multi-target
policy instruments for achieving a set of policy targets.
As Tinbergen emphasizes the differences between policy-mixes
of single-target policy instruments and multi-target policy in-
struments, we discuss in the following paragraphs the most salient
considerations regarding (a) policy mixes where several single-
target policy instruments are used, and (b) multi-target policy in-
struments addressing most or all of the policy targets. Finally, we
will explain the concept of economies of scope with respect to
achieving policy targets, as it will be relevant for interpreting the
model assumptions and results in this paper.2.2. Policy mixes
Policy mixes are deﬁned as combinations of independent in-
struments for addressing one or more policy targets. The OECD3 This is the formal way to express independence in the framework of Tinbergen.
Framed in a more applied way, independence refers to the fact that policy in-
struments can be adapted individually without having to change the other in-
struments at the same time. Thus, e.g. the policy instruments “organic farming
support payments” and “prohibition of pesticides” are coupled to each other, as the
former entails the latter.(2007a) stresses that opportunities for mutually enhancing in-
struments should be exploited. Moreover, instrument mixes pro-
vide the possibility of responding ﬂexibly to a changing
environmental problem. Finn (2005) describes three circumstances
in which policy mixes are applied in policy practice in order to
pursue a policy target: Occasionally, policy mixes are implemented
because of either a poor scheme design or a lack of clarity about the
targets. In other cases, the complexity of the environmental prob-
lem results in the implementation of policy mixes i.e. when clear
causal linkages cannot be established. Furthermore, if several key
mechanisms, i.e. what speciﬁc actions inﬂuences the environ-
mental impacts, are known to be simultaneous driving forces of an
environmental problem, these might be addressed by a mix of
different policy instruments. Using the example of the European
Emission Trading Scheme, Lecuyer and Quirion (2013) show that
overlying instruments can be economically justiﬁable, especially in
the case of uncertainty. Also Braathen (2007) stresses that there are
good economic reasons for using several policy instruments for
addressing a single policy objective. By discussing examples from
household waste policy, agri-environmental policy and energy
policy, he argues that it is necessary to have a good understanding
of the following aspects in order to design effective and efﬁcient
policy mixes: (a) the environmental issue to be addressed, (b) the
links with other policy areas, (c) interactions between different
instruments and (d) the political settings of the country in question.
He concludes that there are cases where the environmental effec-
tiveness or the economic efﬁciency of an instrument mix could be
improved by introducing further policy instruments (Braathen,
2007).
Yet, according to Hepburn (2007), parallel implementation of
several instruments is problematic, if these are incompatible with
each other. If the interactions between different policy instruments
are not carefully considered, they may have adverse effects on each
other. The OECD (2007a) emphasizes that the risk of mutually
conﬂicting policy instruments increases the more policy in-
struments are involved. Additionally, overlapping policy in-
struments ought to be avoided, since these tend to hamper
ﬂexibility (OECD, 2007a) and generate unnecessary transaction
costs (Dabbert et al., 2004). Thus, from a rational policy maker’s
point of view, adding a further policy instrument is only justiﬁed if
transaction costs do not outweigh beneﬁts gained from a more
precise and cost-effective policy. Vatn (2005) described this as the
‘trade-off between transaction costs and precision’.2.3. Multi-target policy instruments
Multi-target policies are deﬁned as policy instruments that
address more than one target simultaneously. A frequently used
example for such a policy is organic farming area support payments
(OFASP). Since the early 1990s, European agri-environmental policy
offers the option of providing ﬁnancial support for organic farming
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agri-environmental programmes, these payments are intended as
incentives for farmers to comply with deﬁned production stan-
dards (H€aring, 2005). Daugbjerg et al. (2011) showed for the UK and
Denmark that organic farming area support payments (OFASP)
affect both the number of organic farms and the area under organic
farming. As compliance with organic production standards averts
negative and provides positive external effects compared to con-
ventional or integrated farming (CRER, 2002; Shepherd et al.,
2003), such payments lead to better environmental performance
of the agricultural sector as a whole.
However, according to von Alvensleben (1998), organic farming
area support payments are inefﬁcient and not economically sound,
as they indirectly address many different environmental policy
targets. Hence, referring to the Tinbergen (1956) model, von
Alvensleben (1998) argues, the policy targets could be achieved
more efﬁciently using more ﬂexible and targeted combinations of
various agri-environmental measures.
Mann (2005b) and the Swiss Federal Council (2009) concluded,
referring to the Tinbergen (1956) Rule, that multi-target policy
instruments are economically inefﬁcient, as the policy targets could
be achieved more efﬁciently by more ﬂexible and more targeted
combinations of various agri-environmental measures. Ahrens and
Lippert (1994) conclude on the basis of the Tinbergen model that ‘a
link of policy instruments should be avoided. […] A link [of policy
instruments] results in the simplest case in merging two policy in-
struments into one’ (Ahrens and Lippert, 1994, p. 152, translated). A
similar deduction is made by Mann (2005a, p. 3):
‘In economic policy literature, this causal relation came to be
known as the Tinbergen-rule. It says that a policy will usually be
more efﬁcient if for each target to be achieved at least one instru-
ment is available. Vice versa: Coupling several targets with one
instrument will lead to inefﬁciencies. Such a coupling will lead to a
situation where several targets can only be achieved with a
particular relation to each other, so that an important degree of
freedom is lost. Even if we deal with an instrument which is able to
achieve more than one target efﬁciently, the problem arises at least
as soon as changes in the environment require an adoption of
instruments’.
Considering our classiﬁcation in Table 1 above, we see that this
criticism applies to Option C, which we discarded as well: it is
usually inefﬁcient to achieve several policy targets with one multi-
target policy instrument.
Other economists, e.g. Dabbert et al. (2004), argue that even
Option C can be legitimate, stressing that an important assumption
of the Tinbergen model, namely the absence of transaction costs, is
not present in reality. The multi-purpose character of organic
agriculture support could increase its cost-effectiveness due to
potentially lower transaction costs compared to a set of targeted
agri-environmental measures (Dabbert et al., 2004). According to
Lippert (2005), reasons for savings of transaction costs due to
organic farming support include:
(a) Savings of administrative costs, because fewer AEMs have to
be administered per farm.
(b) Generally lower costs of control, because the full prohibition
of most synthetic pesticides and synthetic fertiliser is easier
to control than thresholds.
(c) Lower costs of control due to a combined control of several
attributes.
(d) Lower ﬁxed administrative costs due to the use of existing
structures for the establishment of control systems.
(e) Lower intensity of control, to the extent that organic farmers
risk their reputation if convicted of non-compliance with
regulatory standards.Therefore, the saved transaction costs may outweigh the sav-
ings through having a ﬂexible policy portfolio. While reason (a)
and (c) may be applicable to all multi-objective agri-environ-
mental measures, reasons (b), (d), and to an extent (e) as few other
agri-environmental measures have a linked market focus, are
speciﬁcities of OFASP. Economic assessments of agri-
environmental policy measures have shown that policy-related
transaction costs of policy instruments can amount to a substan-
tial share of total public expenditure for agri-environmental policy
(Rørstad et al., 2007). In Switzerland, however, the relative share
of transaction costs of the total budget for agri-environmental
policy is very small (Buchli and Flury, 2005; Mann, 2003).
Furthermore, in two German ‘L€ander,’ empirical data reveal that
transaction costs of organic farming support are in a similar range
as the transaction costs of a combination of agri-environmental
measures (Tiemann et al., 2005).
This debate reﬂects some general agreement that the Tinbergen
Rule may overstate the limitations of multi-target policy instru-
ment. Supporters of such policies, e.g. when arguing for organic
farming support, then tend to concentrate on shortcomings in the
applicability of the Tinbergen Rule to cases where assumptions, e.g.
zero transaction costs, are not realistic. As laid out above, however,
this perception of the Tinbergen Rule's judgement on multi-target
policy instruments in fact only applies to the situation where
several policy targets are pursued with one policy instrument. In
case of several independent policy instruments, no conclusion on
the performance of multi- vs. single-target instruments in such a
mix of policy instruments can be derived from the Tinbergen rule.
2.4. Economies of scope with respect to achieving policy targets
A further issue inﬂuencing the economic performance of multi-
objective agri-environmental measures is economies of scope with
respect to achieving policy targets. Based on a concept proposed by
Panzar and Willig (1977), economies of scope refer to cases where
ﬁrms have lower costs when producing several goods jointly
instead of producing each good separately. Economies of scope
mainly arise due to the joint use of inputs and are seen as a major
reason for vertical and horizontal integration of ﬁrms. For instance,
the fact that a company producing pesticides starts producing seeds
can be explained by the concept of economies of scope. Reasons for
economies of scope can be of a technical or organisational nature.
However, in agri-environmental policy, even if policies are
designed especially to deal with a single environmental problem,
they may have substantial side-effects on other environmental
problems. For instance, buffer strips along streams and river banks
are usually implemented to pursue the targets of both reducing the
transfer of nutrients into waterways and increasing the diversity of
farmland wildlife. Hence, buffer strips could be conceptualised
either as a multi-target policy or a single-target policy with a co-
beneﬁt (Feng and Kling, 2005). The support for buffer strips thus
realises economies of scope by reducing costs, as two policy targets,
namely increased diversity of farmland wildlife and reduced
nutrient transfer into waterways, are achieved.
There is empirical evidence of economies of scope with respect
to policy targets for environmental policy, in particular for climate
and energy policy (Ebi et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011). For example,
Primdahl et al. (2003) analysed environmental impacts of agri-
environmental measures and discovered combined improvement
and protection effects. Smith et al. (2007) looks at the co-beneﬁts
and trade-offs of greenhouse gas mitigation options in agricul-
ture. They identify a large quantity of co-beneﬁts and a lower
number of trade-offs. Several of the measures were found to have
no trade-offs with other impact categories. Aunan et al. (2004) and
He et al. (2010) show co-beneﬁts of climate policy instruments on
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particulates and SO2 in the air) and on health policy targets. These
co-beneﬁts are used as an argument in favour of the measure from
an economic viewpoint (Aunan et al., 2004).
Co-beneﬁts play a major role also in the context of land use.
Kueppers et al. (2004) list potential impacts and propose a land-use
decision matrix for evaluating policies in order to consider the co-
beneﬁts of policies regarding climate change, environmental
impact and socio-economic impacts.
In agricultural policy, the concept of economies of scope has also
been raised in the context of multi-functionality (OECD, 2001). It is
argued that production of non-commodities such as ‘cultural
landscape’ might cause less costs for society when it is produced
jointly with foodstuffs by agriculture (Huber and Lehmann, 2010).
Similarly, economies of scope and corresponding cost reductions
could also be achieved between different non-commodity outputs
(Le Cotty and Voituriez, 2003), e.g. between water pollution
reduction and climate change mitigation policies.
3. Model description
We developed a static budget allocation model, based on linear
optimisation (Dantzig, 1963) in order to numerically analyse the
consequences of using multi-objective policy instruments in agri-
environmental policy mixes. The model simulates the decision-
making process from a rational policy maker’s viewpoint. It con-
sists of a matrix of speciﬁed policy targets and single and multi-
target policy instruments subject to minimisation of public
expenditure as the objective function. The solution procedure de-
termines the optimal mix of single and multi-target policy in-
struments to achieve the policy targets at least cost in terms of
public expenditure.
This analytical model is based on a theoretical model of the key
determinants of cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental measures
(AEM): policy uptake (implementation of the instruments), envi-
ronmental effects of the single instruments, and public expenditure
per instrument (Schader et al., 2008). The assumptions of the
model are kept very simple in order to illustrate the case. It
explicitly excludes considerations with respect to transaction costs
and ‘inconsistency of targets’ (Tinbergen, 1956, p. 135), potential
implications of these simpliﬁcations for the results are discussed in
Section 5.
3.1. Model speciﬁcation
Suppose that a government pursues a set of environmental
policy Targets A, B, and C. These targets could, for example, be the
reduction of fossil energy use, enhancement of biodiversity, and the
reduction of nitrogen leaching. Suppose, further, that the govern-
ment has set speciﬁc quantitative target values and is able to
measure the exact level of target attainment as a percentage. The
aim of the government is to fully reach Target A, B, and C at least
costs or public expenditures respectively.
Employing the basic linear approach from Tinbergen, the
question of the optimal combination of policy measures to achieve
a number of policy targets is a constrained linear optimisation
problem with the following speciﬁcation.
The government has a set of J policy targets and I policy in-
struments to achieve the policy targets. The policy targets are
characterised by target values yj' j¼ 1,…,J for several environmental
indicators, such as energy consumption per ha, numbers of species
per agricultural land ha or tons of nitrogen surplus per ha reduced.
These target variables are coded in such away that higher levels are
always better for the environment (thus, for example, if the policy
target is a low level of eutrophication, then the indicator iseutrophication reduction). We assume baseline levels for these
environmental indicators without policy instruments Bj.
Normally all economic variables show at least minor de-
pendencies on the other ﬁgures due to general interdependencies
in the economic system. Nevertheless, let us assume that it was
possible to pursue each of the targets using a single-target agri-
environmental measure (AEMA, AEMB, AEMC) without side effects
on other policy targets for this exemplary modelling exercise, as
this illustrates the ideal case of a single-target policy instrument.
This assumption will not affect the validity of the model results but
will help underline the most important conclusions that can be
drawn from the model’s results.
The policy instruments are characterised by costs and effects
(policy outcomes) per unit of implementation. Let the unit of
implementation be “hectares under the agri-environmental mea-
sure”. The cost are then deﬁned as “payment levels per ha” PLi,
i¼ 1,…,I, for instance for payments per ha extensively managed
grasslands. Each policy instrument i contributes to achieving the
target value yj of the environmental indicator j by its effects of Eij
per unit implementation. Thus, Eij can and will be 0 for several
targets j for each policy instrument i.
Additionally, assume a multi-target policy instrument (AEMD)
that is able to contribute to all three policy targets simultaneously,
but that is also less cost-effective with respect to individual policy
targets. This assumption ﬁts, with the existing empirical data of
support payments for organic farming in European agri-
environmental schemes, as these are known for (a) positively
inﬂuencing all of the above environmental impacts (M€ader et al.,
2002; Schader et al., 2012; Tuomisto et al., 2012), but (b) are not
as cost-effective as single-target policy instruments (Jacobsen,
2002; Tiemann et al., 2005).
The values of each environmental indicator EJ , realised by
implementing policy instruments i¼ 1,…,I on PIi ha of land (PIi is
the “policy implementation level” of policy instrument i) are:
Ej ¼
XI
i¼1
EijPIi þ Bj (1)
The necessary public expenditure PE to cover the total costs for
the government is then determined by the payment levels PLi and
the respective policy implementation level PIi:
PE ¼
XI
i¼1
PLiPIi (2)
The goal of the government is to achieve all targets at least costs,
i.e. to minimize PE subject to the constraint that Ej¼ yj,cj ¼ 1;…; J:
min
PIi
¼
XI
i¼1
PLiPIi s:t: Ej ¼ yj (3)
For the following discussion, it is advantageous to deﬁne the
relative target achievement by a target attainment index for each
policy target: TAIj¼ Ej/yj, expressed as a percentage. Using Eq. (1),
TAIj can be expressed as the sum of the initial state of target
attainment ISj¼ Bj/yj, and the cumulative impact of the policy in-
struments on Target j:
PI
i¼1EijPIi=yj.
Given the coding of the target indicator variables described
above, full target achievement is characterised by TAIj¼ 100% and
the baselinewithout policy instruments Bj is smaller than the target
value yj. Target attainment indices greater than 100% are possible to
achieve in the model, but are seen as neither more positive nor
negative in terms of welfare, than a 100% target attainment.
Table 2
Assumptions on effects and payment levels per hectare for different policy in-
struments for the illustrative model.
Policy
instrument
Effect on
Target A
Effect on
Target B
Effect on
Target C
Payment
level
AEMA 2 0 0 1
AEMB 0 2 0 1
AEMC 0 0 2 1
AEMD 1 1 1 1
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investigate the performance of a multi-target policy instrument in
comparison to single-target policy instruments. The model was
implemented in GAMS.4 We assumed a situation with three policy
targets, namely (A) the reduction of fossil energy use, (B) the
enhancement of biodiversity, and (C) the reduction of nitrogen
leaching. We further assume that initial target attainment ISj is
speciﬁed to be 50% for Targets B and C. This means that in the initial
state, i.e. before the policy mix is implemented, already 50% of each
of those two targets have been achieved (e.g. through policies in
former periods of time).
The assumptions about environmental effects and payment
levels of each policy instrument are presented in Table 2. Each of
the single-target AEMs (AEMA, AEMB, AEMC) addresses a speciﬁc
target and does not affect the other two targets. On the contrary,
the multi-target AEMD addresses all targets at once, but is less
effective per unit of cost in addressing each single target than the
respective single-target measures.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis
We tested the following assumptions with a sensitivity analysis.
3.2.1. Variable distance to Target A
The model was run with different speciﬁcations of the initial
attainment for Target A varying from 0 to 100% in order to analyse
the model response to changes in the policy environment that are
not controllable by policy makers. This captures the fact that a
policy mix has to be ﬂexible in order to respond to changes in the
initial environmental state.
3.2.2. Variable speciﬁcation of costs, effects for organic farming
support payments
A key determinant for the model is the speciﬁcation of cost-
effectiveness of the policy instruments (AEMA, AEMB, AEMC, and
AEMD) in consideration of all relevant policy targets. As there are no
generalizable ﬁgures for the effectiveness of organic farming area
support payments and speciﬁc AEMs, we tested alternative speci-
ﬁcations of costs and effects in sensitivity analysis. Eq. (4) calculates
the average cost-effectiveness of each policy instrument ACEi by
dividing the average effects on the targets,5 by the payment levels6
of each policy instrument. Thus, contrary to cost-effectiveness of a
policy instrument regarding a single target, ACEi reﬂects the
average cost-effectiveness of a policy instrument regarding all
relevant policy targets. ACEi is the principal indicator for comparing
the different speciﬁcations presented in Section 4.3.4 General Algebraic Modelling System, GAMS Development Corporation, 1217
Potomac Street, NW, Washington, DC 20007, USA
5 For reasons of simplicity, we assume equal weights for each target here. But
principally, different weights for targets, as it is usually done in multi-criteria
analysis, could be included here.
6 We assume policy-related transaction costs to be zero here. The issue of
transaction costs is discussed in Section 5.ACEi ¼
P
j
Eij
J
PLi
(4)
3.2.3. Variable number of policy targets
The number of agri-environmental policy targets in real policy
decision-making problems is likely to be higher than three. For
instance, the Swiss government deﬁned 12 environmental targets
for the natural resources biodiversity and landscape, climate and
air, water, and soil (Aeschenbacher and Badertscher, 2008). Not all
multi-objective policies have positive impacts on all environmental
indicators, however there are examples that come close to such
characteristics. According to Schader et al. (2012) and Shepherd
et al. (2003) organic agriculture support is likely to have a posi-
tive effect on most of these targets. Thus, if the cost-effectiveness of
OFASP was analysed for Switzerland using empirical data, it would
be necessary to take into account all policy targets and the
respective agri-environmental measures addressing these for a full
coverage of the problem.
4. Results
4.1. Model run with equal distance-to-target for all policy targets
If the model described in Section 3 is run with initial state (IS)
for each target being 50%, the optimal solution is not to implement
any of the single-target agri-environmental measures, but only the
multi-target AEMD. Despite there being a single-target AEM for
each target that is more cost-effective than the AEMD, the model
regards AEMD as more efﬁcient. However, looking at Table 2, it
becomes clear that if all policy targets are considered at the same
time, AEMD is more cost-effective.
This result is driven by the following dynamics based on Table 2:
If no target is reached at the beginning, AEMD is implemented until
the ﬁrst target is reached, as it is more efﬁcient than implementing
the three targeted measures together (1 unit cost for 1 unit
improvement in each of the three targets with AEMD vs. 1.5 units
cost for the same improvement with three targeted instruments).
4.2. Model run: with variable distance to Target A
However, in reality we cannot expect to have a policy measure
which will allow us to exactly ﬁll our gap between policy target and
initial state. To simulate this situation, we varied the initial state for
Target A as part of our sensitivity analysis. Fig. 2 shows the optimal
implementation levels7 (left y-axis) for the single-target agri-
environmental measures (AEMA, AEMB, AEMC) and themulti-target
agri-environmental measure (AEMD), depending on the variable
initial state (IS) of target attainment for Target A. the imple-
mentation levels are displayed as dashed lines in the lower part of
the diagram. Along the x-axis, 100 model runs are shown with IS
being 0e100%, while the initial states regarding Target B and C are
ﬁxed at a target achievement of 50%.
In this example, the model optimisation algorithm starts from a
situation where no target is reached. As described above, AEMD is
thus implemented to achieve environmental impacts until one of
the targets reaches a target attainment index of 100. Starting with
zero implementation of A, this is achieved for B and C at the same
time. The remaining gap in target attainment of Target A is then
ﬁlled by the speciﬁc policy measure (AEMA) as this is more efﬁcient7 “Optimal” in this case means combinations of instruments that lead full
achievement of all targets at least cost.
Fig. 2. Optimal implementation of AEMs and the resulting public expenditure with and without use of AEMD with variable initial states of target attainment for Target A.
C. Schader et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 145 (2014) 180e190186then implementing AEMD on more hectares. In addition, the ﬁxed
target prevents additional implementation of AEMA. As long as the
initial target attainment of A remains below 50%, the dynamics
remains the same, with decreasing levels of A needed. At 50% initial
attainment for A, only AEMD is implemented (cf. above). For initial
attainment levels of A greater than 50%, AEMD is implemented till
the target for A is achieved, the remainder in the targets for B and C
can then be reached either with AEMD or AEMB and AEMC together
(both cost 1 unit to achieve 1 unit in each target). Under the
assumption of ﬁxed targets, AEMB and AEMC have to be chosen, as
otherwise the target for A would be surpassed.
With decreasing distance-to-target of Target A, the total public
expenditure goes down until the ISA has reached 50%. For ISA be-
tween 50 and 100% there are no more budget savings achievable. If
the model was run without AEMD in the portfolio of agri-
environmental measures, we get a continuous decrease in public
expenditure with ISA rising from 0 to 100%. This shows that if policy
makers decide not to use multi-objective policy AEMD, they end up
with higher public expenditure if the underlying assumptions of
this model are given. So, the distance between both public
expenditure curves represents the budget savings due to inclusion
of AEMD in the policy mix, in each of the 100 model runs (Fig. 2).
For instance, the public expenditure for the optimal policy mix,
when initial attainment of Target A is 0% would be 75. However, if
AEMD would not be used, i.e. if the targets had to be addressed
merely by the single-target AEMs, a public expenditure of 100
would be required. Thus, the potential budget saving for including
AEMD in the policy mix would be 25, equivalent to 25% of the total
spending on the policy Targets A, B, and C.
Hence, the extent to which AEMD is part of the optimal solution
depends on the relation of the distances between the initial state
and the policy target for the different policy targets and on the
relative costs between the instruments to provide one unit target
achievement. If the distance-to-target is equal for each policy
target, then the model results in the sole implementation of AEMD
(Fig. 2), due to the symmetry in costs and target attainment con-
tributions of the policy instruments considered. If the distance-to-
target becomes greater for one target than for the others, the
remaining gap in target attainment left by AEMD is closed by
implementing the relevant targeted AEM addressing the respective
policy target (in Fig. 2 this is AEMA). At the same time, the budget
share of AEMD goes down if Target A has a lower distance-to-target
than the others.4.3. Variable speciﬁcation of costs, effects and the number of policy
targets
As it was shown in the previous Section, AEMD is part of the
optimal solution and thus of the resulting efﬁcient policy mix. Its
average cost-effectiveness is higher than for the single target pol-
icies, although the cost-effectiveness of AEMD regarding single
targets is lower. But how much lower can the cost-effectiveness of
multi-target policies regarding single targets be, until AEMD is no
longer part of an efﬁcient policy mix?
Based on the model results, this can be derived mathematically
for Eq. (4), outlined in Section 3: The average cost-effectiveness of a
multi-target policy instruments (ACEmulti) should not be less than
the average cost-effectiveness of the single-target policy in-
struments (ACEsingle) divided by the number of policy targets J (Eq.
(5)).
ACEmulti 
ACEsingle
J
(5)
In our case of three policy targets, AEMD is the optimal solution
insteadof the individualAEMs, provided that the cost-effectivenessof
the targeted AEMs regarding the single targets does not exceed three
times thecost-effectivenessofAEMD. If thecost-effectivenessofAEMs
ismore than three times higher than of AEMD, the optimal policymix
consisted of AEMA, AEMB and AEMC only. Hence, AEMD payments can
be up to 66% less cost-effective than targeted AEMs and still provide
themost efﬁcient solution. Correspondingly, AEMD paymentsmay be
up to 66.6% more expensive per unit (e.g. ha of land under the agri-
environmental policy) and still be more efﬁcient.4.4. Variable speciﬁcation of policy targets
If more than three policy targets are included in the model and
the cost-effectiveness relation between AEMD and the other policy
measures is kept constant, the optimal share of AEMD as a pro-
portion of total public expenditure increases correspondingly.
Table 3 shows the relation between ACEmulti and ACEsingle for
1e12 policy targets. For instance, if we have 12 different policy
targets, then the average cost-effectiveness of the multi-target
policy instrument ACEmulti must not be less than 8.3% of the cost-
effectiveness of single-target policy instruments ACEsingle for ACE-
multi to be part of the efﬁcient policy mix.
Table 3
Margin of relation between the average cost-
effectiveness for multi (ACEmulti) and single (ACE-
single) target policy instruments depending on the
number of policy targets (J) before multi-target
measures become inefﬁcient.
J ACEmulti/ACEsingle
1 100.0%
2 50.0%
3 33.3%
4 25.0%
5 20.0%
6 16.7%
7 14.3%
8 12.5%
9 11.1%
10 10.0%
11 9.1%
12 8.3%
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policy maker, for deciding whether to include a policy instrument
in a policy mix. This implies that if policy mixes are designed, this
should be done in view of all relevant policy targets, instead of
looking at the cost-effectiveness of instruments regarding single
targets.
Thus the model results numerically illustrate that AEMD can in
fact be a part of an efﬁcient solution for addressing environmental
problems, not as a sole instrument, but as a complementary in-
strument alongside other measures. The modelled optimal budget
share allocated to AEMD depends on the relative distance-to-target
of environmental categories before applying the instruments and
the effectiveness and costs of the AEMD relative to the single-target
policy instruments.
5. Discussion of the modelling results
The following questions arise from these results: Are the as-
sumptions made likely to be present in reality? How would our
main conclusions regarding the role of multi-objective policy in
agri-environmental policy mixes be affected by changed assump-
tions? Which conditions foster or hinder the use of multi-target
policy instruments? In which situation should policy makers allo-
cate more or less funds to multi-target policy instruments?
We discuss these questions by looking at the main assumptions
of the model as follows: (a) the number of policy targets, (b) the
speciﬁcation of cost-effectiveness of the AEMs, (c) absence of
policy-related transaction costs, d) trade-offs in multi-objective
policies, (e) the existence of economies of scope with respect to
policy targets, (f) the initial states of target attainment, and (g) the
choice of the ﬁxed instead of ﬂexible target model. In order make
the discussion more tangible we discuss the above questions using
organic farming area support payments (OFASP) as an example for
AEMD as implemented in almost all EU Member States.
(a) Number of policy targets
As shown in the sensitivity analysis, the number of policy tar-
gets inﬂuences the lowest value that the average cost effectiveness
(ACE) of the multi-target policy instrument can take before it is
redundant in a mix with single-target instruments. As in most
European contexts the number of agri-environmental policy targets
is at least eight (e.g. Aeschenbacher and Badertscher, 2008;
European Commission, 2014), the marginal relation between the
cost-effectiveness of ACEmulti and ACEsingle that renders ACEmulti
part of the efﬁcient policy mix below 12.5%.(b) Speciﬁcation of cost-effectiveness of the AEMs
It is a complex undertaking to derive empirical ﬁgures for
environmental impacts of different AEMs at a representative scale,
as the environmental impacts of AEMs vary substantially among
farm types, regions and even single farms. Furthermore, site-
speciﬁc measurements are costly, impact assessments methods
lack harmonization and environmental models often rest on un-
certain assumptions. Moreover, the fundamental evaluation bias
(Frondel and Schmidt, 2005), i.e. that the same farm cannot be
observed with and without the policy (the counterfactual), requires
additional statistical tools (e.g. matching methods).
Nevertheless, as far as our example for a multi-target policy
instrument, organic farming area support payments, are con-
cerned literature suggests that a) there are substantial positive
environmental impacts of organic agriculture (M€ader et al., 2002;
Shepherd et al., 2003), and b) if only one outcome is sought, the
costs for deriving single environmental impacts with organic
farming are higher than those of targeted measures, as farmers
have to comply with a bundle of requirements instead of only one
requirement (Uthes et al., 2009; Ziolkowska, 2008). Therefore, our
conservative assumption that the cost-effectiveness for one policy
target of single-target policy instruments is twice the cost-
effectiveness of multi-target policy instruments like organic
farming area support might be justiﬁed. However, Osterburg and
Runge (2007) and Schader et al. (2013) stress that the cost-
effectiveness of AEMs varies substantially. Therefore, to design
an efﬁcient policy mix, a region-speciﬁc analysis of the cost-
effectiveness of available policy instruments is required to
specify Eq. (5) as valid for a multi-objective policy instrument in a
given context or not.
(c) Absence of policy-related transaction costs
A simplifying assumption of themodel presented in this paper is
the absence of policy-related transaction costs (e.g. costs of in-
spection, control and administration). Following the argumentation
by Dabbert and H€aring (2003), the use of multi-target policies
instead of single-target policies can reduce transaction costs of the
agri-environmental policy mix. However, it is obvious that the in-
clusion of organic area support in the policy mix, in addition to
AEMA, AEMB, and AEMC, causes additional transaction costs. On the
other hand, if OFASP is introduced one of the other three policy
instruments can be dropped, as three independent policy in-
struments are sufﬁcient to reach three targets. According to Buchli
and Flury (2005), most of the transaction costs of OFASP will be
borne by the farmer and thus ultimately by the consumer, rather
than by public administration. Nevertheless, the transaction costs
need to be subtracted from the cost savings due to including
organic farming support in the policy mix (for detailed calculations
for Switzerland see Schader (2009)). However, a potential reduc-
tion in transaction costs in case one targeted policy instruments is
abandoned needs to be taken into account as well.
(d) Trade-offs in multi-objective policies
It is important to note that multi-objective policies might
involve trade-offs in the achievement of different environmental
targets. For instance with respect to organic area payments, there
might be a trade-off between policy targets such as increasing
productivity (negative effect) and increasing biodiversity (positive
effect). However, trade-offs between policy targets are also likely to
occur for single-target instruments (Braathen, 2007; Knudson,
2009; Smith et al., 2007). These trade-offs have to be taken into
account. However, this does not contradict the main results of the
C. Schader et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 145 (2014) 180e190188model, as ACE is composed of all policy targets J and negative im-
pacts could be captured by some decrease in ACE.
(e) The existence of economies of scope with respect to policy
targets
If Eq. (5) is fulﬁlled, we can speak of ‘economies of scopewith
respect to achieving policy targets’ (see Section 2 for expla-
nations). But what could be reasons for such economies of
scope when implementing multi-target policy instruments
compared to single-target policy instruments? In the
following, we deduce on the basis of our example “organic
area support payments” three areas which might contribute
to economies of scope.
 ‘Fit’ of policy-instrument: uptake levels of a multi-target
policy instrument may be induced by farm-level re-
strictions e.g. due to the regulatory framework of organic
farming (Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007), regarding
general farming intensity, fertiliser purchase, or stocking
density. In this case, the regulatory framework facilitates
the ‘ﬁt’ of the agri-environmental measures with exten-
siﬁcation of production being the connecting element be-
tween the regulatory framework within which the farm
already operates and the environmental measure.
Furthermore, this ‘ﬁt’ of the policy instrument may also be
supported by the farmer attitudes. Indeed, several authors
(Jurt, 2003; Stotten, 2008) found different attitudes of
organic farmers towards nature conservation compared to
conventional farmers.
 Synergistic effects: synergistic effects might contribute to
economics of scope due to different reasons:
a. Synergistic effects might be due to synergies between
societal and private beneﬁts: consumer demanding
speciﬁc food attributes (e.g. animal welfare friendly
production) are willing to pay a price premium for food
which provide these attributes (Lagerkvist and Hess,
2011; Napolitano et al., 2007; Zander et al., 2013). For
example, organic products deliver additionally to the
societal beneﬁts rewarded through agri-environmental
measures (organic farming area payments) a private
beneﬁt as reﬂected in consumers’ demand for organic
products (Stolze and Lampkin, 2009). Thus, there is a
synergy of private and societal demand. Speciﬁc agri-
environmental measures, on the contrary, so far
hardly generate consumer demand and willingness to
pay a premium price. Thus costs for management re-
strictions of single agri-environmental measures must
be fully covered by the society (Schader, 2009). It is
necessary to keep rewarding farmers’ response to so-
cietal and private demand separate: response to con-
sumer demand resulting in market beneﬁts reﬂect the
entrepreneurial activities of the supply chain actors
and should therefore not be attributed to providing e.g.
public good as response to societal demand expressed
through agri-environmental policies (Lampkin and
Stolze, 2006).
b. Synergistic system effects: according to Niggli et al.
(2008), the system approach of organic farming, e.g.
the combination of many different production rules,
may induce on synergetic environmental effects addi-
tional to the effects of each single restriction. For
instance, while both a ban on pesticides and the use of
traditional, resistant fruit varieties may be inefﬁcient as
single measures, the combination of bothmeasures may
perform well economically. Transfer efﬁciency: Dabbert and H€aring (2003) bring for-
ward the argument of lower transaction costs which go
along with a lower number of instruments and less speciﬁc
instruments could improve transfer efﬁciency. They argue
that a support of organic farming within agri-
environmental policy should be granted ‘where the like-
lihood is low that the costs of missing a target are lower
than the potential savings of transaction costs. This may be
the case in particular where a broad improvement of the
state of a high number of environmental indicators is
aimed at. If there are only speciﬁc environmental aims to
be achieved, it appears to make sense to introduce speciﬁc
instruments within conventional farming (Dabbert and
H€aring, 2003, p. 103).(f) Initial state of target attainment
The initial state of target attainment was varied in the
sensitivity analysis. The more the relation of distances of the
initial states to the targets differs from the relation of the
effects to expected from the multi-target policy instrument,
the less important is the role of the multi-target policy in-
strument within a policy mix. As we have learnt from the
model exercise, it was preferable to use OFASP as a policy
instrument until one of the targets was fully reached. On top
of that, the remaining targets were achieved using single-
target agri-environmental instruments (AEMA, AEMB,
AEMC). Thus, multi-target policy instruments play the most
important role if strong differences between initial states and
target attainment for all environmental indicators are
present.
(g) Tinbergen's ﬁxed target approach
Finally in this discussion, it should also be emphasised that,
inorder to reduce the complexityof thequestionand tostay in
line with Tinbergen's (1956) original ﬁxed target approach,
the upper bound of ‘TAI¼ 100%’ was established. However,
theoretically the constraint could also be deﬁned as
TAI 100%, if further environmental effects are admitted
(ﬂexible targets), which is likely for most environmental in-
dicators. Amodel formulationwithﬂexible targetswould also
be justiﬁed if policy makers are not able to deﬁne a clear
quantitative policy target, e.g. due to a high degree of uncer-
taintyof the environmental impacts of the selected indicators.
In this case, support via multi-target policies could even be
efﬁcient as a single-target measures, as the higher cost-
effectiveness of a multi-target policy may outweigh the
costs of exceeding the set target (cf. the remarks in Section 4).6. Conclusions
This paper clariﬁes the understanding of the Tinbergen Rule and
the implications this rule has for agri-environmental policy. The
main statement of the Tinbergen Rule is that efﬁcient policy re-
quires at least as many independent policy instruments as there are
policy targets. However, the Tinbergen Rule does not imply that
coupled policy instruments are per se inefﬁcient. Neither does it
advise policy makers to abolish multi-target policy instruments.
Rather, from the general analysis and the results of our analyt-
ical linear optimisation model, new insights could be gained
regarding the role of multi-target policy instruments within a
policy mix. The model demonstrates that multi-target policy in-
struments can be an efﬁcient policy instrument in a policy mix,
provided the assumptions of a higher overall cost-effectiveness
regarding the sum of all policy targets are met. This assumption
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multi-target policy instruments. Based on our example of organic
area payments, we identiﬁed three reasons for economies of scope
of multi-target policy instruments: ‘ﬁt’ of policy instrument, syn-
ergistic effects and transfer efﬁciency
Thus, the Tinbergen Rule is a valid and important principle for
policy makers but it cannot be used as a knock-out criterion against
multi-target policy instruments, particularly if economies of scope
with respect to policy targets are likely. Instead, the consideration
of multi-target policy instruments in policy mixes can lead to sig-
niﬁcant budget savings if their average cost-effectiveness over all
policy targets is not lower than the average cost-effectiveness of
targeted instruments (i.e. without any side effects on other targets)
divided by the number of policy targets. Such a use of multi-target
policy instruments in policy mixes does not contradict the Tin-
bergen Rule. The model analysis suggests implementing policies
with a large number of co-beneﬁts in agri-environmental policy in
order to increase the overall cost-effectiveness of a policy mix. On
the other hand, policy instruments that cause substantial trade-offs
with other policy targets should be avoided where possible.
The typical role of multi-target policy instruments within a
policy mix lies in providing a basic improvement with regard to
many different targets. With each target achieved by this multi-
target policy, its relative cost-effectiveness compared to single
measures decreases. As soon as the combined cost-effectiveness of
single-target policy instruments is higher than that of the multi-
target policy, the targeted single target policy instruments need
to be used to speciﬁcally address the remaining targets. Conse-
quently, the question of the cost-effectiveness of multi-target pol-
icy instruments needs to be assessed for each speciﬁc country or
region on the basis of empirical quantitative economic analysis.Acknowledgements
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